A PUBLIC RELEASE ,
INTRODUCTION
The term "information operation" is relatively new to the Army's lexicon of doctrine and strategies. The only doctrinal manual published by the Army devoted to IO is Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations, which is dated 1996. Though FM 100-6 is already five years old, it still presents many seemingly new and controversial concepts for US military forces to employ. Because of the many recent significant technological innovations in the areas of electronics, computers and telecommunications, many military planners consider IO to include only activities conducted using these technologies or using the electromagnetic spectrum.
The question arises as to whether the principles of IO are entirely new concepts or whether they have been applied in past military conflicts. Did IO play a role in General 
METHODOLOGY
The monograph will apply current IO principles to two historical case studies, GEN W. T. Sherman's "march to the sea" campaign (1864-65) during the US Civil War, and ADM C. W. Nimitz's Pacific campaign during WW II. The two case studies represent military campaigns executed at the low operational/high tactical level of warfare. The two campaigns were fought in significantly different timeframes, in different theaters, and with varied tactics and technologies. The separation of time, space, terrain, tactics, and technology suggests the existence of information operation concepts that span the joint spectrum of warfare and that are timeless in application.
Examples of IO will be drawn from the two campaigns and compared to modern definitions outlined in ST 3-0. The evaluation criteria for the comparison will be the characteristics of IO as defined in Chapter Eleven, ST 3-0, Operations.
The initial task is to define the evaluation criteria used to examine the military actions conducted within the two case studies. In each case study, a brief historical summary will be presented to cover the campaign highlights and key events. Pertinent technological facts concerning the information environment of that particular case study's time period will also be covered. Finally, examples of IO will be identified in each case that meet the modern definitions found in ST 3-0.
ST 3-0 lists "information superiority" as the key principle of IO. Each case study will be examined to determine whether the principle of information superiority directly influenced the outcome of the respective campaign. Deception, operations security, physical destruction, psychological warfare, and information assurance are the other 4 evaluation criteria that will be examined in the same manner. A comparison will then be made of the two case studies in an effort to illustrate the early use of IO in the history of US military campaigns.
DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS
ST 3-0, Operations is expected to be released by the Army as FM 3-0, the latest revision of FM 100-5, Operations. The intent of the new manual is to break away from the FM 100-5 doctrine that was designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War environment. The transition to FM 3-0 is a point of departure for basing the updated This process of information management is not limited to just tactical intelligence, but is applicable at the operational and strategic level as well. IO covers a wide spectrum of the information environment that includes the perceptions, thoughts and will of the enemy commander, of friendly and enemy soldiers, as well as of the governments and populations on both sides of the conflict. The method of targeting and influencing these seemingly intangible factors is explained as part of the evaluation criteria. The first criteria and primary concept within the IO chapter in ST 3-0 is information superiority. Information superiority is defined in ST 3-0 as "…the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." 6 Information superiority allows the commander to make better decisions 7 faster than his enemy, causing the enemy to have to deal with multiple problems simultaneously. This dilutes or eliminates the enemy commanders ability to solve the initial problem, giving the friendly commander the initiative in the area of operations.
There are two forms of IO, offensive and defensive. "Offensive information operations are the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities . . .
to affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives." 7 Defensive IO simply protects friendly command and control systems while denying the enemy critical friendly information. The elements that make up offensive and defensive IO include: deception, operations security, physical destruction, psychological warfare, and information assurance. These elements will be the remaining evaluation criteria used in examining the two case studies.
ST 3-0 defines deception as military activities and measures designed to mislead adversaries by manipulation, distortion, or falsification. This includes the employment of friendly forces directed against specified targets or enemy forces. The purpose of deception operations is to influence the enemy's situational understanding and to lead him to act in a manner that favors friendly forces. In summary, the evaluation criteria to be applied to the two historical case studies includes the employment of the following in the operations plans: gaining information superiority, deception, OPSEC, physical destruction, psychological warfare, and information assurance. These characteristics reflect the latest doctrinal thoughts concerning IO within US Army doctrine. Each criterion will reflect technological or historical nuances specific to the time period of the operation but, as will be shown, the underlying principles will remain constant. his Atlanta campaign, Sherman relied on the telegraph to contact GEN Grant, his superior commander. 19 The electric telegraph had been in use throughout the country since the 1840s with access available in many medium-sized towns. 20 As long as these lines were maintained, command and control was significantly enhanced. Eventually, portable telegraph systems, transported by wagon, were emplaced to gain access to wire communications at forward tactical field locations. 21 Most of Sherman's messages to his subordinate units were handwritten and sent by courier, some of which were copied verbatim into his memoirs. 22 Newspapers played an important role in keeping the local population informed of the current situation. In some cases, the Confederates tried to organize resistance to GEN Sherman's army by newspaper.
SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA
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Additionally, railroads served as vital lines of communications for both the Union and the Confederacy. Telegraph lines often followed railroads. The rail junctions tended to be urban centers that also served as logistic bases or industrial production facilities.
Most of the major operations of the war were directed along rail lines or toward major rail junctions. The armies of both sides not only depended on the railroads for their supplies, but also sought to deny rail line use by their enemies. 24 It was along these rail lines of communications that Sherman planned his march to the sea. 19 Sherman continuously refers to his use of telegraph communications to contact GEN Grant in his memoirs. 20 Sherman's march to the sea was designed to execute the principle of information superiority, not only at the operational level by seizing the port of Savannah, but also at the tactical operations. In capturing Savannah, Sherman denied Confederate use of a key rail-sea communications center while reopening his own LOCs. At the tactical level, Sherman employed smaller units to execute information superiority missions.
During his march to the sea, Sherman decided his army would exist off the land.
He maneuvered his forces along a distributed route, sometimes as wide as sixty miles, so his troops could liberally forage from the land. His foragers accomplished several tasks besides providing supplies for their units, including protection for the main body and denying information to the Confederates while collecting information for Sherman's
Army. Operating as much as thirty miles from the main body, Sherman's foragers:
. . . were notorious for seizing key towns or railroad junctions and holding them stoutly until reinforcements arrived or for picking up important information from locals on Confederate plans or whereabouts and riding through hostile territory to report the news at headquarters.
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Foragers employed information superiority in a crude sense by gaining information while simultaneously denying information to the enemy regarding friendly force dispositions. The use of foragers was part of the terror campaign behind the "march to the sea."
As foragers stripped the local area of resources, they reinforced the idea of the destructive capability of the Federal Army and left a lasting impression on the people of the South.
The purpose of the foraging activities, beyond satisfying Army support requirements, was to leave local residents with the idea that this type of destruction could come again as the result of any future attempts at secession. The aim was to suppress any ideas of future resistance by making the costs greater than any anticipated gains, costs not just to the army or government of the confederacy, but also to the people upon whom Confederate institutions derived their support. The campaign needed to be painful and to strike fear into the people of the South so they would never forget and never rise up in rebellion again. Sherman is considered the first general to engage in modern warfare. He sought to end the war by defeating the will of the enemy rather than by attritting forces or denying resources. In a democracy, military power remains dependant on the strength of the popular will that is in turn dependant on economic and social security. By attacking the popular will at its foundation, Sherman effectively defeated the Confederate armies. Nimitz began immediate planning to execute War Plan Orange; the contingency plan developed over thirty years by the US to counter possible Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The campaign plan involved a three-phase operation. Phase one would be to halt Japanese expansion and seize outer perimeter islands in the western PTO for use as staging bases. In phase two, US forces would seize the major islands groups in the far west to isolate Japan. Phase three involved actual operations against the Japanese home islands. Nimitz followed the conceptual framework of the war plan, occasionally choosing to select some different target islands and objectives based upon the tactical and operational situation. The effort to decipher Japanese codes led to several nicknames for the process.
The Japanese diplomatic signals were encoded on a machine that was eventually called "Purple". The raw data acquired through deciphering transmissions from the Purple machine was referred to as " Magic". The intelligence gained from processing the Japanese message traffic was referred to as "Ultra" intelligence, not be confused with the 49 Additionally, the use of Ultra and Magic Summaries to guide US submarines against Japanese shipping produced dramatic effects. Nimitz was an early advocate and visionary when describing the potential of the submarine. In 1912 he said: "The steady development of the torpedo together with the gradual improvement in and the size, motive power and speed of submarine craft of the near future will result in a most dangerous offensive weapon." 61 However, the submarine could only be an effective weapon when guided by good intelligence, the vital information that focused its attack.
Since the ocean was too vast and the targets too small to focus a directed submarine effort against Japanese shipping, information superiority was critical to successful submarine operations. Without information superiority, the US would have required an improbable number of submarines to maintain effective patrol stations. The information gained from the Ultra and Magic Summaries sometimes listed the names, cargoes, and type of escorts, routes and even the expected daily noontime positions. This critical information enabled naval planners to launch scarce submarines with limited range capabilities to specific intercept points, often to guaranteed targets.
62
In one of the islands campaigns, information superiority played a key role with decoded messages being used to aim Nimitz's operations at a specific enemy weakness.
Following the first resisted amphibious assault of the war on Tarawa, Nimitz sought to 60 Potter, 114. 61 Lewin, 218. 62 Ibid., [224] [225] locate his next target at a relatively undefended island. 63 In a strategy session concerning the assault on the Marshall Islands, Nimitz asked for recommendations from his top commanders. From a geographic standpoint, Kwajalein Atoll dominated the region. Air reconnaissance indicated the Japanese had built airfields and strengthened their defenses.
All his Navy and Marine subordinate commanders recommended other targets, specifically reorienting to the Outer Islands. But Ultra intelligence reports indicated the Japanese were sending reinforcements from Kwajalein to the perimeter islands. Using daily personnel reports, Layton was able to confirm Kwajalein's relative weakness compared to the surrounding islands. Against the recommendations of his subordinates and armed with a confirmed enemy order of battle, Nimitz ordered the assault and seized the island with relatively few losses.
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Following the Battle of Coral Sea, Nimitz employed deception techniques to guarantee success in the battle of Midway. With the Japanese believing they had sunk the carriers Lexington and Yorktown in the Coral Sea, Nimitz sent his two other carriers, the Hornet and Enterprise, toward the Solomon Islands to lead the Japanese to believe all remaining US aircraft carriers were in the South Pacific. 65 In the Japanese minds, this situation opened up the Central Pacific to their invasion force headed to Midway.
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Nimitz reinforced this deception through electronic means. In early June he had a US cruiser in the Coral Sea to continue broadcasts on ". . . frequencies normally assigned to 63 Nimitz was criticized by military and civilian leaders because of the high casualty rate suffered by US Marines during the amphibious assault of Tarawa. 64 Lewin, [194] [195] [196] The Hornet and Enterprise were returning from the Doolittle raid and were unavailable for the Coral Sea action. Once in the Solomon area, the carriers went back to Pearl Harbor to prepare for the Midway engagement. 66 Potter, 94. carrier air groups. . ." to make the Japanese believe that the US carriers Hornet and Enterprise were still operating in the South Pacific.
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To successfully carry out the deception involving the location of US carriers, OPSEC was vital in allowing Nimitz to prevent the Japanese from detecting his carrier force as it left Pearl Harbor. FRUPAC identified a refueling point that Japanese reconnaissance seaplanes had been using to extend the range of their air patrols from the While he did not conceive the operation, Nimitz supported the Doolittle raid on Japan for its psychological effect on the Japanese people and for its boost to US morale.
Nimitz's subordinate, ADM William "Bull" Halsey, was assigned the task of carrying out this risky mission. The USS Hornet would carry sixteen B-25 medium bombers close enough for them to strike Japan and fly to China. After launching the aircraft, the ship would return to Pearl Harbor. Another carrier, the Enterprise, would provide air cover as the Hornet carried only the bombers. Nimitz weighed the risk involved and chose to proceed with the operation.
The residual effect of the raid was more psychological than tactical. Though only minor damage was inflicted on Tokyo by the bombing, it was the first time the Japanese homeland and people had been attacked. Doolittle's raid struck directly at the Japanese psyche by bringing dishonor to the Japanese Navy. Aircraft launched from US carriers the Imperial Navy should have destroyed at Pearl Harbor had attacked the Japanese Empire. The raid forced the conservative Japanese naval planners to accelerate their timetables in their efforts to destroy the US carriers. 70 This led to increased communications between stations to rearrange timetables and ship schedules, leading to increased intercepts by US intelligence.
71 69 Prados, 459-460. 70 Lewin, 96 . 71 Prados, [293] [294] Nimitz employed information assurance by limiting the number of people who knew about the ability to break and decode JN 25. When distributing the intelligence to the fleet, the information was scrubbed to prevent any potential interpretation that the US was reading the Japanese codes. The island of Midway provides an example of how carefully coded information was confirmed. In their message traffic, the Japanese had stated AF was their primary target for an attack. To guarantee the accuracy of the deciphering of the Japanese code, and to substantiate the conjecture that AF was the code name for Midway Island, FRUPAC dispatched a false report that a Midway Island freshwater pump had broken. In subsequent message traffic the Japanese reported AF's freshwater pump was broken, confirming FRUPAC had positively identified the Japanese main objective.
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To further safeguard the knowledge that the US had broken Japanese codes, Nimitz sent a task force to meet the Japanese deception assault on the Aleutians Islands.
He sent a small unit of cruisers and destroyers under ADM Robert A. Theobald to oppose the Japanese landings that had turned up in the Ultra intelligence. The Japanese landings were meant to draw US naval resources away from Midway. Though intelligence indicated it was a deception attempt, Nimitz had to react to the Japanese assault to avoid the Japanese becoming suspicious the US was reading their message traffic.
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ADM Nimitz fully embraced and exploited IO. He capitalized on the intelligence gained through the code breakers, giving him unquestionable information superiority and confidence that his transmissions were secure. The following statement emphasizes the accuracy of Nimitz's information superiority: ". . . errors about the state of the Japanese . 72 Freshwater was necessary to make concrete that would be used to repair runways. 73 Potter, 99. In both campaigns, IO played a prominent role. While the South was in a deteriorating military situation in 1864, the strategic/political situation was uncertain.
COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
Overtures were being made by the Confederate leadership to negotiate a settlement without reunification of the Union. Sherman sought to deliver a final blow to the Confederacy and its secessionists. While Sherman's march is credited with destroying many valuable resources, it was the psychological impact in the information environment that produced the most dramatic effects. Sherman's march increased the desertion rate, magnified President Davis' hollow promises of protection, and further eroded the will of the Southern population, ultimately leading to the collapse of the Confederacy.
Nimitz's "miracle at Midway" was not luck. By exploiting the elements of information operations, including information superiority, deception, OPSEC, and information assurance, Nimitz won a decisive victory in his pacific campaign. He set the stage for Midway at Coral Sea, checking the Japanese advance on Port Moresby and deceiving the Japanese into believing all remaining US carriers were in the South Pacific.
He then struck the Japanese main effort at Midway, sending a smaller force to engage the Japanese feint in the Aleutians. Nimitz was able to concentrate his naval forces in time and space by skillfully exploiting the information superiority he had achieved over the Japanese. Nimitz was able to adroitly employ information superiority to achieve temporary numerical equality in forces and eventually numerical superiority in the PTO.
While it is difficult to examine either case study and prove definitively that IO was the decisive element in the campaign, the fact remains that IO played a prominent role in decisive operations for both campaigns. In each case study the commanders were From these he extended his operational reach while at the same time denying the Japanese the ability to contact and support their isolated bases.
Nimitz identified the Japanese center of gravity to be their main carrier division.
Nimitz was able to direct his numerically inferior force to the correct place in time and space and defeat a superior force through the skillful use of information superiority. His superior situational awareness gave him the ability to leverage his limited combat power directly against the Japanese center of gravity.
One of military history's greatest theorists, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, postulated that military campaigns, or grand strategies, should be directed along logical lines of operations. Jomini's conceptual strategic model included decisive points that lay sequentially upon the lines of operations. Jomini emphasized the importance of directing the mass of one's forces against the decisive points. As these decisive points were achieved or secured, one would naturally be successful in the advance toward the final objective. This objective was usually located at the end of a logical line of operation.
of operations. By using IO principles they were able to achieve their decisive points along these lines of operations. The comparison and analysis of these two case studies indicate IO are enablers to decisive operations. predict Japanese intentions through the use of deciphered intercepts, Nimitz was able to initially economize and safely concentrate his naval forces to neutralize Japanese strength at Midway. Once the balance of power was relatively equal in the Pacific, Nimitz used information superiority to seize islands and slowly win a naval battle of attrition.
IMPLICATIONS AND FINDINGS
Japanese industry could not match US industrial ability in the production of ships.
US military planners should look to incorporate new information technologies into future operations. While the commander or planner may not be familiar with the actual technology, he or she must understand the capabilities, products and/or results the new technology could provide. Nimitz relied on information and intelligence specialists to provide him the knowledge he needed to visualize, describe and then direct his operations against the Japanese. It is unlikely he fully understood the technical details of 78 Miller, [349] [350] radar, of deciphering messages, or of intercepting radio signals, but Nimitz used the products of these technologies to gain information superiority over the Japanese.
Simultaneity of action is a concept not limited to simply engaging multiple military targets at once. The concept can be extended to having simultaneous objectives assigned to each target. As seen in Sherman's march to the sea against the operational military target of the port of Savannah, the operation simultaneously attacked the strategic will of the Southern population. Nimitz ordered the attack that killed
Yamamoto not only for the military effect of removing an important commander but also the psychological blow it would have on the command system and the minds of the Japanese sailors. Simultaneous targeting should take into consideration the informational impact of each selected target to achieve maximum benefit. This informational analysis is crucial to efficient targeting. Nimitz's exploitation of information superiority over the Japanese in the Pacific campaign directly contributed to his victory. In his first two engagements at Coral Sea and Midway, Nimitz was able to economize and concentrate his smaller naval forces because of his superior knowledge of the tactical and operational situation in the PTO.
Nimitz to focus on offensive operations aimed at reducing Japanese presence throughout his area of operation.
IO was a decisive component in the campaigns presented in each case study. By capitalizing on the benefits of psychological warfare and information superiority, Sherman and Nimitz were able to achieve decisive results in their respective campaigns.
Sherman forced the South into capitulation through psychological warfare, and Nimitz eliminated Japanese naval power in a campaign of naval attrition through enhanced situational awareness.
In examining these historical examples, future military planners can gain an appreciation for the importance of synchronizing IO into military campaigns. The plans and actions of GEN Sherman and ADM Nimitz provide real applications of IO in target selection to capitalize on the residual effects that their action would have on the tactical, operational, and even political/strategic environment.
